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What role did law enforcement play in promoting COVID-19 
restrictions in the United States during the spring and summer of 2020? 
Because most law enforcement in the U.S. occurs at the local level, we 
surveyed local police departments to examine their responses to the COVID-
19 pandemic. Our results show that most departments, especially those in 
smaller jurisdictions, played a minimal role in enforcing COVID-related 
restrictions and tended only to encourage compliance. Further, it was 
extremely rare for a department to use sophisticated surveillance technology 
to monitor COVID compliance. This lack of monitoring stands both in stark 
contrast to the regimes employed by several comparable industrialized 
countries and in spite of the broad surveillance powers permissible under the 
U.S. Constitution. 
I. POTENTIAL FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT INVOLVEMENT 
In March 2020, state governments and municipalities across the United 
States began to issue orders in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. At first, 
these orders closed nonessential businesses and instructed large portions of 
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the population to stay at home.1 Starting in May 2020, these blanket 
prohibitions were peppered with increasing nuance as portions of the country 
engaged in phased reopening.2 
Some COVID-related restrictions were effectively self-enforcing. If a 
municipality ordered its schools closed, then the schools were closed. But 
many COVID-19 restrictions required compliance by and cooperation from 
non-governmental actors. Private businesses needed to close. People needed 
to stay in their homes. And those who left their homes needed to wear masks 
and avoid unnecessary (by some definition of “unnecessary”) contact. 
The best research available at this early date suggests that the moderate 
social distancing restrictions put in place were very useful in slowing the 
spread of COVID-19.3 But important questions remain about the relative 
importance of government action versus voluntary compliance in achieving 
social distancing, and the extent to which governments could have improved 
compliance where such policies were enacted.4 
In this study, we examine the role of law enforcement in promoting 
community compliance with COVID-19 restrictions. To what extent did 
American law enforcement engage in community interventions? And, when 
they did intervene, what exactly did they do? 
In many other countries, government agents used mass surveillance 
tools to monitor compliance with COVID-19 orders. Countries such as 
Taiwan, Singapore, Austria, and South Korea used cellphone location data—
sometimes GPS, sometimes Bluetooth—to track the movements of infected 
people and enforce quarantine orders.5 In Israel, France, and China, 
 
 1 For a review of which restrictions were in place in which states at which times, see, e.g., 
Lindsay K. Cloud, Katie Moran-McCabe, Elizabeth Platt, & Nadya Prood, A Chronological 
Overview of the Federal, State, and Local Response to COVID-19, in ASSESSING THE LEGAL 
RESPONSES TO COVID-19 10–16 (Scott Burris, Sarah de Guia, Lance Gable, Donna Levin, 
Wendy Parmet, & Nicholas Terry eds., 2020). 
 2 See id. 
 3 See, e.g., Evan Anderson & Scott Burris, Is Law Working? A Brief Look at the Legal 
Epidemiology of COVID-19, in ASSESSING THE LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, 20, 23 (Scott 
Burris, Sarah de Guia, Lance Gable, Donna Levin, Wendy Parmet, & Nicholas Terry eds., 
2020). 
 4 See id. 
 5 Isobel Asher Hamilton, Compulsory selfies and contact-tracing: Authorities everywhere 
are using smartphones to track the coronavirus, and it’s part of a massive increase in global 
surveillance, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 14, 2020, 11:30 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/
countries-tracking-citizens-phones-coronavirus-2020-3 [https://perma.cc/6S8L-9KMP]; 
Kareem Fahim, Min Joo Kim & Steve Hendrix, Cellphone monitoring is spreading with the 
coronavirus. So is an uneasy tolerance of surveillance, WASHINGTON POST (May 2, 2020, 3:12 
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/cellphone-monitoring-is-spreading-with-the-
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governments used drones to ensure people with COVID-19 were following 
stay-at-home orders.6 And these technologies could be highly efficient. If 
you are not supposed to leave your home except for essential activities, then 
your cellphone’s location tracking will rapidly betray you. If people are not 
supposed to be gathering in public spaces, then video surveillance footage 
and drones may be a cost-effective way of spotting crowds. 
It is common in legal scholarship to talk about the broad range of law 
enforcement surveillance that is permissible under the U.S. Constitution. 
Many papers have reflected on the possibilities of facial recognition, drone 
surveillance, and cellphone tracking.7 In general, there would be little 
constitutional problem with using some of these techniques for COVID- 
monitoring purposes. Government aerial surveillance, which presumably 
includes drone surveillance, was held to be permissible without a warrant 
decades ago.8 Warrantless use of surveillance cameras in public places has 
been repeatedly held to be constitutional, though a minority of courts have 
expressed skepticism about long-term warrantless watching of an individual 




 6 Joseph Krauss, Israeli Police Use Drones to Enforce Virus Quarantines, TIMES OF 
ISRAEL (Apr. 14, 2020, 10:43 PM), https://www.timesofisrael.com/israeli-police-using-
drones-to-enforce-coronavirus-quarantines/ [https://perma.cc/XS85-7XCW]. 
 7 Andrew Ferguson, Facial Recognition and the Fourth Amendment, 105 MINN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020) (facial recognition); Emma Lux, Privacy in the Dumps: Analyzing Cell 
Tower Dumps Under the Fourth Amendment, 57 AMER. CRIM L. REV. 109, 109–18 (2020) 
(cellphone tracking and tower dumps); Alisa Smith, Sean Madden, & Robert P. Barton, An 
Empirical Examination of Societal Expectations of Privacy in the Digital Age of GPS, Cell 
Phone Towers, & Drones, 26 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 111, 132 (2016) (various technologies); 
Matthew B. Kugler & Thomas H. Rousse, The Privacy Hierarchy: Trade Secret and Fourth 
Amendment Expectations, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1223, 1273–82 (2019) (use of various 
technologically enabled visual surveillance techniques, including high powered cameras and 
drones). 
 8 See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 
450–51 (1989). 
 9 See, e.g., United States v. Houston, 813 F.3d 282, 287–88 (6th Cir. 2016); United States 
v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 1269, 1281 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that a pole camera is not a search 
even if it observes the curtilage of a property), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other 
grounds, 531 U.S. 1033 (2000). But see Kugler & Rousse, supra note 7, at 1277–79 
(describing the judicial discomfort with this result and a potential for a split of authority on 
the topic). 
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constitutionally permissible even though there are good policy arguments 
that its use should be restrained.10 
The only COVID-monitoring technology subject to substantial legal 
controls is cellphone location data. Use of long-term historic cellphone 
location data for criminal investigations requires a warrant.11 Nevertheless, 
cellphone location data is regularly used in criminal investigations—
presumably via court-approved channels—so this regulation hardly amounts 
to a ban.12 
In other work, we examined the possibility of national contact tracing 
using cellphone location technology, concluding that such non-law 
enforcement use would be permissible as a “special needs” search provided 
the program incorporated privacy safeguards.13 Having law enforcement use 
the same technology without a warrant to punitively enforce stay-at-home 
orders is a harder constitutional sell—the whole point of a “special needs” 
search is that it is for a purpose outside the general needs of law enforcement. 
But this only matters for cellphone location data. The other technologies, 
such as drones and video cameras, are outside the warrant requirement, and 
law enforcement could therefore employ them at will.14 
There were even some scattered reports of these technologies being 
used. One Connecticut town considered experimenting with fever-detecting 
drones, but abandoned the proposal due to community opposition.15 Several 
 
 10 See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 7 (arguing for limited Fourth Amendment protection 
supplemented by statutory privacy laws given the strong policy case in favor of limiting facial 
recognition use). Though some localities have banned law enforcement use of facial 
recognition, there are comparatively few of these. 
 11 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018). 
 12 As we mention in the text accompanying note 36, infra, three quarters of police 
departments in our sample report at least sometimes using cellphone location data in the course 
of their normal activities. See also Zack Whittaker, T-Mobile Quietly Reported a Sharp 
Increase in Police Demands for Cell Tower Data, TECHCRUNCH (July 12, 2019 12:23 PM) 
(reporting that in 2018, T-Mobile received over 70,000 requests for historic cell location data, 
over 27,000 requests for prospective locations, and over 6,000 requests for tower dumps) 
https://techcrunch.com/2019/07/12/t-mobile-cell-tower-government-demands/ 
[https://perma.cc/B3A5-S2S6]. 
 13 Matthew Kugler & Mariana Oliver, Constitutional Pandemic Surveillance, 112 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2021). (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3669232) [https://perma.cc/URP3-TX7K]. 
 14 See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005) (“Official conduct that does not 
‘compromise any legitimate interest in privacy’ is not a search subject to the Fourth 
Amendment.”). 
 15 See, e.g., Westport Police Said They Will Not Test ‘Pandemic Drone’ That Can Sense 
Fevers, Coughing, NBC CONN. (Apr., 23, 2020), https://www.nbcconnecticut.com/news/local
/westport-police-said-they-will-not-test-pandemic-drone-that-can-sense-fevers-
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state governments trawled through social media looking for evidence of 
vacationers failing to respect quarantine orders, sometimes issuing fines.16 
And, on the non-law enforcement front, both news organizations and public 
policy experts used cellphone location data to track the movements of large 
groups of people and confirm whether regions were respecting stay-at-home 
orders.17 
There was also some conventional enforcement of social distancing 
guidelines. Police in New York City and Chicago, for instance, both cited 
people for masking and distancing violations early in the pandemic and then 
later abandoned these efforts.18 Even these short-lived efforts were not 
without controversy. Citation data suggested that guidelines were enforced 
more severely against people from minority communities, for example.19 
We know that many of these surveillance techniques, especially 
cellphone location tracking, drones, and facial recognition, were used for 
 
coughing/2260023/ [https://perma.cc/6UB7-XUE9]; Alex Williams, The Drones Were Ready 
for this Moment, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/23/style/dro
nes-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/K677-XFL5]. 
 16 Lisa Kubota, Social Media Proves a Powerful Tool in Cracking Down on Quarantine 
Violations, HAW. NEWS NOW (May 19, 2020, 7:45 PM), https://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/
2020/05/20/recent-changes-have-beefed-up-enforcement-traveler-quarantine/ 
[https://perma.cc/WR2T-P6WX]; Chicago Will Check Social Media to Help Enforce Travel 
Order: CDPH Commissioner, NBC CHI. (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/
local/chicago-will-check-social-media-to-help-enforce-travel-order-cdph-
commissioner/2316577/ [https://perma.cc/QU5G-ZHWW]. 
 17 Justine Coleman, Apple Now Sharing Mobility Data from Apple Maps, THE HILL (Apr. 
14, 2020, 3:28 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/technology/492763-apple-now-
sharing-mobility-data-from-apple-maps-to-help-public [https://perma.cc/H5GZ-5MVD]; 
Jason Murdock, Mobile Phone Location Data of Florida Beachgoers During Spring Break 
Tracked to Show Potential Coronavirus Spread, NEWSWEEK, (Mar. 27, 2020, 11:11 AM), 
https://www.newsweek.com/x-mode-tectonix-coronavirus-heat-map-tracking-mobile-data-
covid-19-spring-break-1494663 [https://perma.cc/KX8S-ENYF]. 
 18 Martin Kaste, Police Back Off From Social Distancing Enforcement, NPR (May 15, 
2020, 4:58 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/15/857144397/police-back-off-from-social-
distancing-enforcement [https://perma.cc/2EWY-H9RS]; Maxwell Evans and Kelly Bauer, 
Chicago Police Only Arrested People For Social Distancing Violations on the South and West 
Sides, Data Shows, BLOCK CLUB CHI. (May 26, 2020, 3:20 PM), https://blockclubchicago.org/
2020/05/26/chicago-police-only-arrested-people-for-social-distancing-on-the-south-and-
west-sides-data-shows/ [https://perma.cc/5QAW-PBHP]. 
 19 See Evans & Bauer, supra note 18; Ashley Southall, Scrutiny of Social-Distance 
Policing as 35 of 40 Arrested Are Black, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com
/2020/05/07/nyregion/nypd-social-distancing-race-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/S9VG-
3775]; Janell Ross, Pattern of Uneven Social Distancing Enforcement Coming Into View, Civil 
Rights Experts Say, NBC NEWS (May 28, 2020, 12:05 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
news/nbcblk/pattern-uneven-social-distancing-enforcement-coming-view-civil-rights-
experts-n1216506 [https://perma.cc/VAL9-3PST]. 
24 KUGLER, OLIVER, CHU, & LEE [Vol. 111 
COVID containment overseas with apparent success.20 We also know that 
many of these, except for cellphone tracking, could be employed 
domestically without running afoul of the Constitution. And we know that at 
least a few departments used or thought about using them.21 
But there is some reason to think that all of these enforcement and 
monitoring actions were rare in the United States. In New York, for instance, 
reporters pointed out that social media readily showed that people were not 
respecting 14-day quarantine orders—with no particular government 
sanction.22 And, though many municipalities own drones, have experience 
with cellphone tracking, and possess a bewildering array of other 
technological tools ranging from video cameras to facial recognition, there 
were remarkably few stories of them being used.23 This is surprising given 
the vast number of local law enforcement agencies in the United States—
approximately 16,000.24 Though some of them may have done many things 
to enforce COVID guidelines—generating isolated headlines—there is no 
clear evidence that most did so. 
This brings us to the central question of the present research: what did 
local law enforcement do in the spring and summer of 2020? 
Constitutionally, they could do much. Internationally, there were many 
examples of comparable countries doing much. Is it the case that American 
departments instead did little? 
 
 20 See, e.g., Moran Amit, Heli Kimhi, Tarif Bader, Jacob Chen, Elon Glassberg & Avi 
Benov, Mass-surveillance Technologies to Fight Coronavirus Spread: the Case of Israel, 26 
NATURE MEDICINE 1167, 1167–69 (2020) (describing the efficacy of Israel’s cellphone contact 
tracing); Derek Thompson, What’s Behind South Korea’s COVID-19 Exceptionalism? 
ATLANTIC (May 6, 2020) https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/whats-south-kor
eas-secret/611215/ [https://perma.cc/YLG8-K6YR] (describing the success of South Korea in 
reining in its initial high COVID case count through rapid testing and extensive technological 
surveillance); Fahim, Kim & Hendrix, supra note 5 (describing the experiences of several 
jurisdictions, including South Korea and Singapore, with tech-enabled contact tracing and 
isolation monitoring). 
 21 See, e.g., supra notes 15–16. 
 22 Alyson Krueger, New York Has A 14-Day Quarantine. Many New Yorkers Are Ignoring 
It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/16/nyregion/coronavirus-
quarantine-nyc.html [https://perma.cc/4DYY-G3CM]. 
 23 See, e.g., Nena Beecha, Mass Surveillance to Track the Coronavirus Threatens Black 
and Brown Communities, TEEN VOGUE (June 2, 2020) https://www.teenvogue.com/story/
mass-surveillance-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/6B7Y-Z43E] (expressing great concern over 
use of mass surveillance but citing only occasional use of drones domestically). 
 24 Brian A. Reaves, Hiring and Retention of State and Local Law Enforcement Officers, 
2008 – Statistical Tables, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., (Oct. 2012), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/hrslleo08st.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GRS-FAPU]. 
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II. SURVEY OF LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS 
In collaboration with CivicPulse, we conducted a survey of local police 
departments between June 16 and July 3, 2020 to evaluate how they 
responded to COVID-19. Specifically, we sought to determine what the 
departments were trying to do, with what tools, and why. Participants were 
randomly chosen from a universe consisting of the heads of law enforcement 
of U.S. local governments with populations of over 1,000 residents plus an 
existing police department.25 Data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Census of 
Governments (2017) reports 38,779 general purpose local governments 
across the U.S., a figure that includes municipal, township, and county 
government units.26 In total, we received responses that answered the key 
COVID questions from 370 jurisdictions.27 Of these jurisdictions, 62 have a 
population of fewer than 2,600, 146 have a population of between 2,600 and 
10,000, and 162 have a population of 10,000 or more. The survey first asked 
about law enforcement technology use generally before focusing specifically 
on the issue of COVID-19 enforcement. The more general technology results 
will be the subject of a forthcoming paper. 
For the main analyses reported below,28 we weighted responses at the 
county level to account for differences between the sampled jurisdictions and 
national averages on benchmark measures. A probability weight was created 
with a post-stratification raking procedure using Census and election data.29 
 
 25 CivicPulse defines a jurisdiction as a county, municipality, or township. For context, 
“the average local jurisdiction population in the United States is 6,200” people. Wendell Cox, 
America is More Small Town Than We Think, NEW GEOGRAPHY (Sept. 10, 2008), 
https://www.newgeography.com/content/00242-america-more-small-town-we-think 
[https://perma.cc/K4JS-EY68] (citing data from the 2002 Census of Governments). 
 26 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2017 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS tbl. 3 (2017), 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/econ/gus/2017-governments.html 
[https://perma.cc/SE4H-GYEZ]. 
 27 The recruitment email specified that heads of departments should take the online survey 
themselves, or, if appropriate, they should forward it to another agency official more 
knowledgeable about the issues addressed by the survey. Approximately 80% of the 460 
starting the survey completed it, which is why the portion of the sample relevant to the COVID 
analysis is 370. Of the 370 respondents in the COVID sample, only 11.4% self-identified as 
something other than “head of the department.” 
 28 Specifically, results are weighted for the analyses in Table 1, reporting the overall 
frequency of enforcement and encouragement actions, and the frequency of protests analysis 
on page *11. All other analyses are unweighted because they are performed on a subset of the 
data. As can be seen in Table 1A in the Appendix, weighting barely affected results. 
 29 Variables included: proportion of residents 25 or older with a 4-year college degree 
(taken from the 2015 American Community Survey); total number of residents (same); 
proportion of votes for Donald Trump in 2016 (election results); proportion of white residents 
(same); urbanicity (taken from the 2010 census); and police spending (taken from the 2017 
US Census of Governments). 
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This procedure is adapted from the methodology outlined by Matthew 
DeBell and Jon Krosnick for the American National Elections Study 
(ANES).30 
As an initial matter, we asked what role these departments sought to 
take in enforcing COVID-19 rules. Specifically, we asked whether the 
department sought compliance with each of three specific types of COVID-
19 guidelines through “encouragement” actions, such as posting signs, or 
“enforcement actions,” such as issuing fines. As shown in Table 1, most 
departments reported taking only “encouragement” actions. Less than 15% 
of departments reported engaging in any kind of “enforcement” activity (such 
as issuing fines) for each category of COVID-19 guideline. Departments in 
larger jurisdictions tended to be more likely to take enforcement actions, 
however. In larger jurisdictions, enforcement was slightly more common for 
avoiding large gatherings (21.0% for jurisdictions with populations over 
10,000, 14.4% for populations between 2,600 and 10,000, and 11.3% for 
populations below 2,600), avoiding in-person work (21.0%, 15.1%, and 6.5% 
respectively), and social distancing (16.0%, 13.7%, and 9.7% respectively). 
Importantly, these general types of orders were virtually universal. At their 
height in late April, every state but South Dakota had closed non-essential 
businesses, and every state but South Dakota, North Dakota, and Utah had 
either a stay-at-home order or a ban on large gatherings.31 
Those jurisdictions that reported either not taking any actions or only 
taking encouragement actions received follow-up questions that asked them 
to report why they had chosen those courses.32 Specifically, they were asked 
either why they had chosen to take no action (22 of the 370 departments 
answering this question) or why they had decided to forgo enforcement 
action in favor of encouragement (260 of the departments). 
  
 
 30 Matthew DeBell & Jon A. Krosnick, Computing Weights for American National 
Election Study Survey Data, ANES Technical Report Series, No. nes012427. (2009). 
Available at https://electionstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/nes012427.pdf [https://
perma.cc/W442-MKX9]. 
 31 See, e.g., Cloud, Moran-McCabe, Platt, & Prood, supra note 1, at 14. Of the six South 
Dakota departments in our sample, one reported engaging in both enforcement and 
encouragement, one reported engaging in neither enforcement nor encouragement, and 4 
reported some encouragement actions. 
 32 To receive the “No Action” follow-up, respondents had to select the “Neither” category 
for all questions. To receive the “Encouragement Only” follow-up, respondents had to select 
“Encouragement” at least once and never select “Enforcement” or “Both.” 
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Table 1: Percentage of departments reporting taking “Encouragement” 
or “Enforcement” actions to promote compliance with COVID-19 
guidelines. 
 
Among those whose departments reported taking no action, many said 
that they believed the guidelines were unnecessary (59.1%). If this seems 
surprising given the effects of COVID-19 nationally, recall that at least one 
sheriff actually barred his deputies and departmental visitors from being 
masked.33 Notably, there were fairly few departments in the “No Action” 
category—only 22. So, these responses should be interpreted with some 
caution. 
Many more departments were in the “Encouragement Only” category, 
and in combination, their reasons tell a story. Only 7.3% of departments 
reported that another agency had jurisdiction over these orders, so these 
departments view themselves as the appropriate agencies to be enforcing the 
guidelines. But their actions nevertheless stop at encouragement, and many 
felt that they were not receiving guidance from above (45.0%) or that they 
did not need to do more than they were given the level of compliance they 
were observing in their communities (41.9%). More than two-thirds of 
departments selected at least one of those two options (70.8%). Importantly, 
only a small fraction reported that they believed the guidelines were 
unnecessary (10%). Use of encouragement rather than enforcement therefore 
does not seem to be due to principled disobedience. 
Respondents in both the “No Action” and “Encouragement Only” 
categories did not frequently cite concern with community disapproval as a 
reason for their preferred policy choice, though community attitudes could 
easily have informed the guidance the department received from other 
portions of the government. 
 
 
 33 Caitlin O’Kane, Florida Sheriff Bans Deputies and Visitors From Wearing Face Masks: 




Encouragement Enforcement Both Neither 
Avoiding large gatherings 74.0% 1.3% 11.7% 13.0% 
Avoiding in-person work except 
for essential businesses 
70.2% 2.9% 10.2% 16.7% 
 "Social distancing" in public 
(e.g., staying 6 feet apart) 
77.7% 2.5% 10.3% 9.5% 
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Table 2: Reasons for adopting particular COVID-19 approaches. 
  
No action Encouragement Only 
Concerns about community disapproval 18.2% 31.9% 
Lack of resources or personnel 31.8% 30.8% 
Lack of clear guidelines from local or state 
government 
36.4% 45.0% 
Non-compliance has not been an issue 36.4% 41.9% 
Another department has jurisdiction 13.6% 7.3% 
Guidelines are inappropriate/unnecessary 59.1% 10.0% 
Other: _____34 18.2% 13.1% 
None of the above 0.0% 8.8% 
Total Number of Departments Responding 22 260 
 
Perhaps unsurprising given this lack of enforcement actions was 
departments’ use—or rather, non-use—of surveillance technology for 
COVID-19 related purposes. Even though the question proposed a list of six 
different technologies that might be used, 92.1% of departments reported no 
use of any special technology for the enforcement of stay-at-home orders or 
other COVID-19 related purposes. Of those using any technology, the most 
commonly cited was video cameras (5.9%). Only 5 of 356 departments 
(1.4%) mentioned using facial recognition of any kind, only 4 (1.1%) 
reported using each of drones, cellphone location data, and credit card data, 
and only 2 (0.6%) mentioned using utility data.35 And this was not due to any 
great shyness about use of technology generally. In contrast, 76.2% of these 
departments reported using cellphone location data for other purposes such 
as emergencies or investigations.36 
Thinking about how certain actors may use these technologies for 
COVID-19 enforcement reveals a disconnect between regular police practice 
and the kind of use that would be suited to a pandemic environment. Normal 
uses of cellphone location tracking for law enforcement would be either 
 
 34 Two of the four departments selecting this response in the “no action” column indicated 
that they believed that enforcement would be unconstitutional in most cases. For the 
encouragement only column, five of thirty-four departments leaving comments cited 
constitutional problems. 
 35 The number of responses varied somewhat by question in this survey. 356 answered the 
technology question and 370 the COVID enforcement question. 
 36 This data will be discussed more fully in forthcoming work by the authors Kugler & 
Oliver, Constitutional Pandemic Surveillance, supra note 13. 
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tracing a particular person’s movement or gathering a list of people who had 
been near a particular location at a particular time.37 Those are historical 
cellphone location data, the subject of the Supreme Court’s 2018 Carpenter 
decision, and tower dumps, respectively. Major cellphone companies have 
established procedures for fielding such requests.38 
One could build an apparatus to monitor cellphone location data for 
quarantine enforcement. It could check where each phone slept each night, 
whether it left that place and made multiple “stops” out in the world, whether 
it left the state. But this would be very different than anything American 
police departments regularly do. When Israel engaged in cellphone tracking 
for quarantine enforcement, it adapted a program used for counterterrorism.39 
The American equivalent would be tasking the National Security Agency 
with COVID-19 related citizen surveillance, rather than the New York Police 
Department. 
As of the spring and early summer of 2020, then, local law enforcement 
played a relatively minimal role in enforcing COVID-19 related orders. Its 
role was primarily one of encouragement, and most agencies appear to have 
been relying on voluntary compliance. The kind of mass surveillance 
contemplated in other countries was simply beyond American police 
departments’ normal mission. 
There was one final role for local police in combating the effects of 
COVID-19. In early May 2020, before the uptick of Black Lives Matter 
protests in late May and early June, there was considerable discussion in the 
media about anti-COVID-19 safety protests.40 The respondents in our sample 
reported that these protests were rare in their localities; only 11.9% reported 
having had any protests at all. Again, this experience varied somewhat by the 
size of the department. Acts of protest were much more common in larger 
jurisdictions.41 Importantly, however, only 1% of departments reported 
 
 37 See, e.g., Whittaker, supra note 12 (reporting on the number of law enforcement 
requests for this data in 2017 and 2018). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Monica Chin, Israel Is Using Cellphone Data to Track the Coronavirus, THE VERGE 
(Mar. 17, 2020, 1:52 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/17/21183716/coronavirus-
covid-19-israel-natanyahu-cellphone-data-tracking [https://perma.cc/LK65-WJVF]; see also 
Amit,. Kimhi, Bader, Chen, Glassberg & Benov, supra note 20. 
 40 See, e.g., Lois Beckett, Armed Protestors Demonstrate Against COVID-19 Lockdown 
at Michigan Capital, GUARDIAN (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2020/apr/30/michigan-protests-coronavirus-lockdown-armed-capitol 
[https://perma.cc/6AFW-9FS2]. 
 41 17.6% of jurisdictions with a population over 10,000 reported protests, compared to 
13.4% of jurisdictions with a population between 2,600 and 10,000 and 6.6% of jurisdictions 
with a population below 2,600. 
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protests that had “posed a threat to public safety” in the eyes of the 
department. Controlling a highly disruptive protest would be within the 
routine mission of a police department. But anti-COVID-19 safety protests 
were both rare and rarely disruptive, even from the perspective of law 
enforcement.42 
CONCLUSION 
As of the early summer of 2020, there was no national effort to couple 
pandemic surveillance against COVID-19 with police enforcement of stay-
at-home and social distancing orders. This lack of police activity was not due 
to any inherent legal restriction—constitutionally, much could have been 
done to monitor compliance with these orders. Many local police 
departments, however, reported feeling that further action was not needed. In 
contrast to Israel and South Korea, the United States has not punitively 
employed the tools of mass surveillance in the pandemic domain. But we 
cannot predict whether law enforcement will take a more expansive role to 




 42 Further information about the frequency of protests is available in the CivicPulse 
whitepaper Patterns of Local Protests against COVID-19 Restrictions across America, 
https://www.civicpulse.org/protest-report [https://perma.cc/V8LC-UGYD] (October 2020). 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1A: Unweighted percentage of departments reporting taking 




The unweighted analysis of protest prevalence shows that 13.8% 
experienced protests, including 0.8% that the department thought were a 
threat to public safety. 
 
Encouragement Enforcement Both Neither 
Avoiding large gatherings 74.1% 2.4% 14.3% 9.2% 
Avoiding in-person work except 
for essential businesses 
71.1% 4.1% 12.2% 12.7% 
“Social distancing” in public 
(e.g., staying 6 feet apart) 
78.1% 1.9% 12.2% 7.8% 
